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This paper presents a set-theoretical conceptual framework for theorizing
about (possible) events, and states some analytical and synthetical principles
which describe the way in which the concept of reality (or actuality) applies
to them. The conceptual framework has few primitives, but is nevertheless




T – the set of time-points; it is assumed to be non-empty.
S – the set of total momentary states*; it is assumed to be non-empty. The
asterisk indicates that the elements of S are states which are individuals, not
sets; below we will mainly consider states which are sets, not individuals, and
“state” without asterisk will always refer to those. You may think of total
momentary states* as obtainable by a procedure of abstraction and varia-
tion: take a complete (zero-extended) slice of the world (which is considered
to be a temporally extended entity), abstract from its temporal position,
that is, consider merely its contents, and vary its contents ad libitum, but
consistently; this gives you every total momentary state*.
≺ – the before-relation (a set of ordered pairs); it is assumed to be non-
-empty, and to be a relation in T, which is irreflexive, transitive and linear
in T. (Linearity of ≺ in T: for all elements t and t′ of T: t ≺ t′ or t′ ≺ t or
t = t′.)
The assumptions presented in connection with these three primitives are
minimal. They may, of course, be extended. No objections to this.
1.2. Defined concepts
Monadic concepts:
D1. S is a momentary state iff S is a non-empty subset of S.
D2. S is a total momentary state iff S is a singleton subset of S.
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D3. R is a temporal region iff R is a non-empty subset of T.
D4. R is a minimal temporal region iff R is a singleton subset of T.
D5. R is a connected temporal region iff R is a temporal region, and for all
elements t, t′ of R: all t′′ with t ≺ t′′ ≺ t′ are elements of R.
A connected temporal region is a set of time-points that has no lacunae with
respect to ≺, T and every minimal temporal region are trivially connected
temporal regions.
D6. R is an interrupted temporal region iff R is a temporal region, but not
a connected one.
D7. f is an event iff f is a (set-theoretical) function, the domain of f is a
temporal region, and for all elements t of the domain of f: f(t) is a momentary
state.
The motivation behind this definition is that anything whose intrinsic make
is described by stating what is going on at each moment of a certain stretch of
time (interrupted or not) is an event, and that an event is always something
whose intrinsic make is described by stating what is going on at each moment
of a certain stretch of time. This conception of events is at least as legitimate
as any of the many others that have been put forward in recent years. Events
are, of course, not literally certain set-theoretical functions; but they can be
conceptualised as being such functions.
Who would like to reserve the term ‘event’ for something more specific
than what is described by the definiens of D7 is free to do so; he may take
the definiens of D7 to define the predicate ‘f is a pre-event’; then he can
hold that only some pre-events are events, namely pre-events having such
and such properties.
D8. f is a momentary event iff f is an event whose domain is a minimal
temporal region.
D9. f is a process iff f is an event, but not a momentary one.
Processes form a species of events; this is quite in harmony with ordinary
discourse. However, there is also some tendency in ordinary discourse to
reserve the term ‘event’ for momentary events: ‘event’ has in some uses the
connotation of suddenness.
D10. f is an uninterrupted process iff f is a process whose domain is a
connected temporal region.
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D11. f is a stable state iff f is an uninterrupted process, and for all t, t′ in
the domain of f: f(t) = f(t′).
A stable state, which is an event, is quite a different entity from a momentary
state, which is not an event. The (uninterrupted) standing of a specific vase
on a specific table between two specific moments of time is an example for
a stable state; it is the temporally uninterrupted repetition of one and the
same momentary state: the specific vase standing on the specific table.
D12. f is a pure change iff f is an uninterrupted process, and for all t, t′ in
the domain of f with t different from t′: the intersection of f(t) and f(t′) is
empty.
The momentary states that are the functional values of a pure change are all
incompatible with one another: their intersection is empty: there is no total
momentary state* in which they both obtain. The (uninterrupted) move-
ment of a specific particle from one specific place to another specific place
between two specific moments of time (in a specific manner, for example,
in a straight line and unaccelerated), is an example for a pure change. The
momentary states that are succeeding each other in it are all incompatible
with one another, because at each moment of the change the particle is at a
different place and because the momentary states the particle being at place
p and the particle being at place p′ are incompatible if p and p′ are different.
D13. f has an end iff f is a process, and there is a t which is element of the
domain of f, such that any t′ with t ≺ t′ is not element of the domain of f
(in short: the domain of f has a last element).
D14. f has a beginning iff f is a process whose domain has a first element.
D15. f is bounded iff f has a beginning and an end.
D16. f is a temporally maximal event iff f is an event whose domain is T.
D17. f is an event maximal in contents iff f is an event, and for all elements
t of the domain of f: f(t) is a total momentary state.
D18. f is a world-history iff f is an event that is maximal temporally and
in contents.
Non-monadic concepts:
D19. R is the temporal extension of f iff f is an event, and R is the domain
of f.
© 1995 by Nicolaus Copernicus University
Events and Their Reality 27
D20. S is the state of f at t iff f is an event, t is an element of the domain
of f, and S = f(t).
D21. S is a sub-state of S′ iff S and S′ are momentary states, and S′ ⊆ S.
It would be inadequate to use the clause “S is a subset of S′” instead of the
clause “S′ is a subset of S” in order to express that momentary state S is
a sub-state of momentary state S′. Since the contents of momentary states
becomes greater the fewer elements they have (total momentary states have
maximal contents and are singleton sets), it is clear that only “S′ is a subset
of S” can adequately express that S is a sub-state of S′: because this is
taken to imply that the contents of S is contained in the contents of S′.
D22. f is a sub-event of g iff f and g are events, and the domain of f is
a subset of the domain of g, and for all elements t of the domain of f:
g(t) ⊆ f(t).
According to this definition f is a sub-event of g just in the case: the temporal
extension of f is contained in the temporal extension of g, and for every
moment t in the temporal extension of f the state of f at t is a sub-state of
the state of g at t.
It is easy to prove the following results: Every event is a sub-event of
itself; any sub-event of a sub-event of x is a sub-event of x; if x and y
are subevents of each other, then they are identical. This means that the
sub-event-relation has the basic properties of a part-relation.
D23. f is a phase of g iff f is a momentary event that is a sub-event of g,
and for all elements t of the domain of f: f(t) ⊆ g(t).
From the definiens can be deduced: g(t) = f(t) for the single time-point t in
the domain of f.
D24. f is a section of g iff f is a sub-event of g, and for all elements t of the
domain of f: f(t) is a subset of g(t), and for all elements t, t′ of the domain of
f such that t ≺ t′: there is no element t′′ of the domain of g with t ≺ t′′ ≺ t′
which is not a member of the domain of f.
From the definiens can be deduced: g(t) = f(t) for all elements t of the
domain of f.
If f is a section of g, then the domain of f captures without residuum
a certain stretch of the temporal extension of g, whether this stretch is
a connected temporal region or not. Thus an uninterrupted process f is a
section of g, if its domain is a subset of the domain of event g and if we have
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for every element t of its domain g(t) = f(t); but if g is itself an interrupted
process, it also has sections which are interrupted processes; moreover every
phase of g is also a section of g.
D25. f and g are compossible events iff f and g are events, and for every
t which is an element both of the domain of f and the domain of g: the
intersection of g(t) and f(t) is non-empty.
Events whose domains have no time-point in common are trivially compos-
sible.
D26. M is a set of collectively compossible events iff M is a set of events
such that for all non-empty subsetsM′ ofM: for all elements t of the inter-
section of the domains of all g in M′: the intersection of the values g(t) for
all g in M′ is non-empty.∗
D26 is a (massive) generalization of D25. It can easily be proved: f and g
are compossible events iff {f,g} is a set of collectively compossible events.
Note that we have:
Fact 1. The definiens of D26 is equivalent to:
M is a set of events such that for all elements t of the union of the domains
of all g in M: the intersection of the values g(t) for all g in M of whose
domain t is an element is non-empty.∗∗
Proof. Given that M is a set of events.
“⇒” Assume that for all non-empty subsets M′ of M, for all elements
t of the intersection of the domains of all g in M′: the intersection of the
values g(t) for all g inM′ is non-empty. Let t be an element of the union of
the domains of all f in M. Then {g ∈ M : t ∈ the domain of g} is a non-
empty subset M′ of M, and t (trivially) is an element of the intersection of
the domains of all g in M′. Hence, by the assumption, the intersection of
the values g(t) for all g in M′ is non-empty. Hence the intersection of the
values g(t) for all g in M of whose domain t is an element is non-empty.
∗ Editors note: In symbolic language – M is a set of collectively compossible events iff
M is a set of events and for allM
′
, t: if ∅ 6=M′ ⊆M and t ∈
⋂
{dom(g) : g ∈M′}, then⋂
{g(t) : g ∈M′} 6= ∅.
∗∗ Editors note: In symbolic language – The definiens of D26 is equivalent to: M is
a set of events and for any t: if t ∈
⋃
{dom(g) : g ∈ M}, then
⋂
{g(t) : g ∈M &
t ∈ dom(g)} 6= ∅.
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“⇐” Let M′ be a non-empty subset of M. Assume that for all elements
t of the union of the domains of all g in M: the intersection of the values
g(t) for all g in M of whose domain t is an element is non-empty. Let t be
an element of the intersection of the domains of all g in M′. Then t is an
element of the domain of every g in M′. Hence — since M′ is non-empty
— there is an element g of M′ of whose domain t is an element. Hence
there is an element g of M of whose domain t is an element (since M′ is a
subset of M); hence t is an element of the union of the domains of all g in
M. Hence, by the assumption, the intersection of the values g(t) for all g
in M of whose domain t is an element is non-empty. Hence there is a total
momentary state* s which is an element of the value g(t) for all g in M of
whose domain t is an element. Hence there is a total momentary state* s
which is an element of the value g(t) for all g inM′ of whose domain t is an
element (since M′ is subset of M). Hence there is a total momentary state*
s which is an element of the value g(t) for all g in M′ (since t is an element
of the domain of every g in M′). Hence the intersection of the values g(t)
for all g in M′ is non-empty. QED
Functions: In defining event-functions matters could be simplified by al-
lowing the empty set to be a momentary state (“the impossible momentary
state”), and — in consequence — by countenancing events which have the
empty set as value for some t in their domain. However, this seems too far
a departure from the ordinary meaning of ‘event’.
Let M be a non-empty set of collectively compossible events:
D27. The event which is the sum of the M-events
df
= the function f: the
domain of f is the union of the domains of all g inM, and for every element
t in the domain of f: f(t) = the intersection of the values g(t) for all g inM
of whose domain t is an element.
If the condition of D27 is fulfilled, then the event which is the sum of the
M-events is an event of which all M-events are sub-events, and it is itself
sub-event of every event of which all M-events are sub-events, in short: it is
the smallest event of which all M-events are sub-events.
We can say simply say “the conjunction of theM-events” instead of “the
event which is the sum of the M-events”.
Let g be an event such that for no element t in its domain g(t) = S:
D28. The negation-event of g
df
= the function f: the domain of f = the
domain of g, and for all elements t of the domain of f: f(t) = S \ g(t).
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Examples of negation-events of given events are most easily specified for
those events which are stable states. The (uninterrupted) not-standing of a
specific vase on a specific table between two specific moments of time is the
negation-event of the (uninterrupted) standing of that vase on that table
between those moments of time.
Let M be a non-empty set of events:
D29. The disjunction of the M-events
df
= the function f: the domain of f is
the union of the domains of all g inM, and for all elements t of the domain
of f: f(t) = the union of the values g(t) for all g in M.
Let 29 definitions suffice for giving an impression of the fruitfulness of
the chosen conceptual framework (one more definition follows further down).
It is natural to head next for the definition of event-causation. But this is
not my concern here.
2. The Reality of Events
For an event to be actual or real is to happen. Not all events happen (but
only events happen); hence some events are not actual, but merely possible.
2.1. Analytical principles for to happen
H1. For all x: x happens iff x is an actual (real) event.
H2. For all x, y: if x happens and y is a sub-event of x, then y happens.
H3. If M is a non-empty set of collectively compossible events, all of which
happen, then the event which is the sum of the M-events happens.
A consequence of H3 is for example: If y is an event every phase of which
happens, then y happens (since every event is identical to the conjunction
of its phases).
Using H2 it is easy to prove: If M is a non-empty set of collectively
compossible events and the conjunction of theM-events happens, then every
element of M happens.
The analytical nature of these three principles can hardly be doubted.
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2.2. Synthetical principles
However, it is at least possible to hold that the following principles are
synthetical:
H4. The set of all events that happen is a set of collectively compossible
events.
Note that we have:
Fact 2. H4 is equivalent to the principle:
There is a world-history of which all events that happen are sub-events.
This principle may be termed “the Unity of Event-Reality”. In going from
H4 to the Unity of Event-Reality the Axiom of Choice is needed; elementary
set-theory is not sufficient.
Proof. “⇒” Assume the set M of all events that happen is a set of col-
lectively compossible events. By the Axiom of Choice there exists a function
f whose domain is T and which satisfies the following description: in the case
t is an element of the union of the domains of all g in M: f(t) is a singleton
subset of the — by assumption non-empty — intersection of the values g(t)
for all g in M to whose domain t belongs. For all other elements t of T f(t)
is an arbitrary total momentary state. Clearly f is a world-history of which
all events that happen are sub-events.
“⇐”Assume there is a world-history h of which all events that happen
are sub-events. LetM′ be a non-empty subset of the setM of all events that
happen, and let t belong to the domain of every g inM′. Then every element
g of M′ is a sub-event of h. Hence h(t) — a singleton set — is a subset of
g(t) for every g in M′. Hence the intersection of the values g(t) for all g
in M′ is non-empty. This means that M is a set of collectively compossible
events. QED
Because of the proved equivalence of H4 and the Unity of Event-Reality,
I use ‘H4’ also as a label for the latter principle.
H5. There is a world-history which happens.
This principle may be termed ‘the Completeness of Event-Reality’. Since
world-histories are events, H5 implies that there is an actual event: a world-
-history which happens; and by H2 we obtain that every sub-event of it is
an actual event, too.
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2.3. Theorems
On the basis of H4 and H5 we have:
Theorem 1. There is precisely one world-history which happens.
For the proof of this it is important that if a world-history h is sub-event of
a world-history h′, then h and h′ are identical; given this, the proof is easy.
We can define:
D30. TWH (“The World History”)
df
= the world-history which happens
(which is real).
“The World History” is not to be confused with “the world-history” — a
definite description which would refer (as meant) iff there were precisely one
world-history.
On the basis of H4 and H5 it can be proved:
Theorem 2. For all x: x happens iff x is a sub-event of TWH.
Proof. Assume x happens. Hence, by H4, x and TWH (since, according
to Theorem 1, TWH is a world-history which happens) are sub-events of
a world-history h. Hence h is identical to TWH. Hence x is a sub-event
of TWH. The reverse is a simple consequence of H2 (since, according to
Theorem 1, TWH happens). QED
The conjunction of H4 and H5 cannot be replaced by ‘There is precisely
one world-history which happens’: H4 cannot be obtained from this. Nor can
the conjunction of H4 and H5 be replaced by another corollary of it: ‘There is
precisely one world-history of which all events that happen are sub-events’:
H5 cannot be obtained from this. But the impossibility is marginal indeed:
Assume there is a precisely one world-history h of which all events that
happen are sub-events; assume h does not happen, hence a phase {〈t,h(t)〉}
of h does not happen.
In the case there is no momentary actual event m with the domain {t}
such that h(t) is a subset of m(t) [that is, such that m(t) is a sub-state of
h(t)]: replace h(t) by any other total momentary state in h = {. . . , 〈t,h(t)〉 ,
. . . }. This gives you a world-history h′ different from h. All events that
happen are also sub-events of h′ — contradicting the assumption.
In the case there is a momentary actual event m with the domain {t}
such that h(t) is a subset ofm(t): the setM of all such events is a non-empty
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set of collectively compossible events. Hence, by H3, the conjunction of the
M-events f is an event that happens. Take any total momentary state of
which f(t) is a sub-state and which is different from h(t), and replace h(t)
in h by it (there must be at least one such total momentary state; else m
would not be different from {〈t,h(t)〉}, what it must be, since it happens,
but {〈t,h(t)〉} does not). This gives you a world-history h′′ which is different
from h. All events that happen are also sub-events of h′′ — contradicting
the assumption.
From this it is clear that we need only to add to the basic assumptions
that there is more than one total momentary state* (what is utterly plau-
sible) in order to obtain H5 from ‘There is a precisely one world-history of
which all events that happen are sub-events’.
But the conjunction of H4 and H5 is without further assumptions equiv-
alent to: There is a world-history which happens of which all events that
happen are sub-events. If this is deemed to describe a contingent fact, that
needs explaining, then H4 and H5 are synthetical principles.
They can, however, be made analytical principles by turning Theorem 2
into a definition: x happens
df
= x is a sub-event of TWH, and — treating
TWH as a proper name for some world-history, not as a definite description
— by adding the analytical principle: TWH is a world-history. H4 and H5
(and H3 and H2) can then be obtained as analytical theorems.
This procedure is very elegant; but there is a considerable problem at-
tached to it: Which world-history — presumably there is more than one (and
there is more than one, if there is more than one total momentary state*)
— is to be accorded the honor of being The World History such that ‘to
happen’ means being a sub-event of it? This seems to be a question which
cannot be settled by stipulation. By what then? — Hard to say.
Thus it appears after all that the best treatment of ‘The World History’
is to regard it as short for ‘the world-history which happens’ (what is done
in D30). But then it is impossible to regard Theorem 2 as a definition of ‘to
happen’, and the possibility of regarding the unity and completeness of the
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